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Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is viewed as predominately a security issue, however the 
economic ramifications of an attack against a high-value target such as a container vessel, cruise 
ship, or petro-chemical facility elevate the problem from a national level to cause for global 
concern (Allen, 2008).  A significant attack could cause the port to shut down and spread anxiety 
throughout the global marketplace. To mitigate the danger posed by maritime vessels, the United 
States (US) Navy, Coast Guard, and law enforcement agencies need greater maritime domain 
awareness, appropriate legal agreements, and partnerships. A large effort is underway to develop 
technologies to help maintain MDA, legal arrangements for sharing information, and guidance 
for military and law enforcement personnel on procedures to deal with this multi-faceted 
problem. In this paper, we report on the progress made in 2008 to improve the effectiveness of 
systems provided to the warfighter in MDA missions (including Coast Guard, law enforcement, 
and other agencies). In line with the theme for this year’s symposium – command and control 
(C2) and agility – the maritime threat environment is a complex problem with multiple variables 




Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a National Security concept that relies on the aggregate 
capabilities of multiple government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal, state, and local agencies to achieve 
comprehensive situational awareness of any threat associated with the maritime domain. The 
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Department of the Navy, 2005) defines 
the maritime domain as “all areas and things on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a 
sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, 
people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.” Moreover, the National Plan identifies 
nation-state, terrorist, transnational criminal and piracy, and environmental and social threats 
within the maritime domain. In order to address these threats, the National Plan requires the 
capability to: (a) persistently monitor, in the global maritime domain, vessels and craft, cargo, 
vessel crews and passengers, in all identified maritime situation awareness areas of interest; (b) 
access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure; (c) collect, fuse, analyze, and 
disseminate information to decision makers to facilitate effective understanding; and, (d) access, 
develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance. 
 
The DoD, following guidance set forth in the National Concept of Operations for MDA, 
developed the Fleet Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness (Department of the 
Navy, 2009) and the Navy MDA Concept (Department of the Navy, 2007), which describe the 
Fleet role in MDA and how Fleet commanders will develop and maintain MDA to accomplish 
Navy missions across the full Range of Military Operations. These and other publications 
provide a foundation for developing interagency and agency-specific policies, processes, 
procedures, and organizational relationships to align activities that contribute to achieving MDA 
throughout the Global Maritime Community of Interest. The U.S. Navy has the responsibility to 
develop a comprehensive, worldwide MDA capability. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy 
has appointed the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to assess the overall capabilities and needs 
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of MDA.  In this paper we report on the progress made in 2008 to improve the effectiveness of 
the warfighter (including Coast Guard, law enforcement, and other agencies) in MDA missions.  
 
This effort focused primarily on the set of MDA systems that the Program Executive Office 
(PEO), Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) has designated 
Spiral-1. Our assessment is based on data from numerous tests, experiments, and studies of 
MDA systems directed by PEO C4I and conducted by Operational Test & Evaluation Force 
(OPTEVFOR) or by NPS. Specifically, we have aggregated and analyzed data from 
observations, surveys, chat logs, and interviews from six experimental and empirical exercises 
where operators used MDA Spiral-1 technologies, and from other events in which those technol-
ogies were discussed by operational personnel. We applied a comprehensive assessment 
structure and methodology (Schacher, & Freeman, 2008) that was developed and validated in the 
Trident Warrior series of exercises that began in 2002. The assessment structure was customized 
to MDA, and it can be used throughout the MDA program to evaluate technologies, 
organizations, processes and other enabling components of the MDA solution. Our findings and 
recommendations are presented using this structure.  
 
Background 
This objective for this NPS effort was to: (1) Refine a project plan that provides a concept of 
operations (CONOP) around the core operational threads (e.g., standard work flows, or “business 
practices”) to be then further used for operational field experimentation in Trident Warrior 08; 
(2) Specify measures and metrics related to decision making and the continued evolution of 
MDA system elements that will impact the Global War On Terror, and are also consistent with 
the DoD, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) experimentation and 
acquisition program needs; (3) Integrate efforts across MDA working groups, brought together in 
operational testing venues, under a consistent experiment design process that will also include 
standard metrics developed for MDA analysis of capabilities to ultimately assess Spiral-1 
capabilities against fleet requirements. 
 
Accordingly, this effort: (1) defined the current MDA workflow that new systems must support 
and how these new technologies will impact the current MDA workflow; (2) defines a measure-
ment and assessment framework for evaluating MDA systems (technological, procedural, and 
organizational); and, (3) applies this framework in an assessment of MDA systems. 
 
In 2007 the Secretary of the Navy directed the fielding of a prototype MDA capability by August 
2008, and established a Cross Functional Team (CFT) to oversee the effort. Spiral-1 will:  (a) 
Provide a capability to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM) areas of responsibility (AORs), interagency partners, and select friendly and allied 
nations. (b) Create a network that, at multiple levels of security and across multiple domains, will 
feed many data streams into a common operational picture (COP) accessible throughout the 
United States Government and foreign or Coalition partners. (c) Be able to handle time-sensitive 
maritime threats. (d) Be designed for expansion.  The effort will be used to resolve or develop 
new policy and procedures for MDA. Subsequent spirals will extend this capability and add 
functionality. 
 
MDA Spiral-1 Technologies 
This assessment reported on in this paper focused predominately on the eight Spiral-1 
technologies, which were tested in 2008. Several other technologies deemed to have high 
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potential impact on the MDA mission were also included in this assessment. For a more detailed 
description of the tools see Hutchins, Gallup, MacKinnon, Schacher, Miller, Freeman, Dunaway 
& Poeltler, 2008.  These technologies are:  
 Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) – The Naval Research Laboratory’s 
enhanced vessel tracking project 
 Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) – The Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service’s non-classified system for information sharing of law enforcement information 
 Global Trader – The Office of Naval Intelligence’s cargo data and anomaly detection tool 
 Maritime Global Network (MAGNet) – The Coast Guard’s intelligence program 
backbone database with enhanced anomaly detection for people  
 Tactical Electronic-Maritime Interdiction Operation (E-MIO) System Wireless – An 
E-MIO data collection and transfer system  
 Fast Connectivity for Coalition Agents Program (FAST2CAP) – A common maritime 
operating picture that allows the watchstander to construct, implement and reconfigure 
search agents 
 Tripwire – Office of Naval Intelligence’s threat detection tools 
 Google Earth – A commercial toolset for fusing data and displaying it on a globe 
 
Data concerning other non-Spiral-1 MDA systems (e.g., MDA Data Sharing Community of 
Interest (DS COI), a system for disseminating automatic identification system (AIS) data, and 
Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activity (PANDA) were also collected during the test 
events and these results are also included in this report.  
 
In the following sections we describe our method of analysis, summarize our findings, present 
recommendations, and present detailed findings in each assessment area.   
 
Assessment Method 
The assessment method used for this MDA effort extends the methodology developed and 
refined for the Trident Warrior series of exercises, which has continued to be refined since 2002. 
The elements of this method include: (1) Define a framework for assessment in the MDA 
domain; (2) Collect data from test and experimental venues; and (3) Categorize data using the 
framework, assign scores to categorized data, and summarize the data. These steps are described 
in more detail below. 
 
Assessment Framework 
The MDA assessment framework specifies a three-level hierarchy of assessment areas, attributes 
that apply to each assessment area and the associated metrics used to evaluate performance for 
that attribute, and specific measures. For example, the attribute ‘accessible’ – when applied to 
measuring the sub-area Information Retrieval, under Technical Performance – would be 
measured by collecting data on both the percentage of time information is available, and how 
efficient the process was for retrieving information, i.e., number of steps involved to access the 
information. However, when applying the attribute ‘accessible’ to the sub-area Information 
Sharing (also under Technical Performance) it would include a combination of a measure for 
compatible (system interoperability), in addition to measures for available, and efficient. This 
framework is designed to address technological systems, organizational structures and processes, 
policy or guidance, and other factors that ensure a robust mission capability. (See MDA 
Assessment Areas and Structure, in Appendix A.)  
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The assessment framework addresses five distinct assessment areas, and two levels of sub-areas 
within them. The five assessment areas are: 
 
 System Performance concerns how well a system performs its functions, its support of 
MDA operations, warfighter acceptance, automation, and system management and 
security functions.   
 Operations Performance addresses the quality of knowledge management concerning 
vessels of interest (VoIs), MDA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and 
MIO. 
 Warfighter Performance focuses on operator acceptance and understanding of the MDA 
mission, as well as unit and individual capability to execute that mission. 
 Organization/Guidance focuses on the fit of organizational structures and processes to 
the MDA mission including Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center 
(MOC), the sufficiency of agreements between entities, and the adequacy of guidance 
within entities.  
 Supportability and Readiness concerns factors that ensure MDA Spiral-1 systems are 
robust and reliable.  
 
Capability indicators (or assessment metrics) have been defined for each of the Assessment 
Areas.  These indicators include both attributes and their measures. (These capability indicators 
were taken from those used for the Naval Network Warfare Command Capabilities Based 
Analyses for network-centric operations (NCO), command and control (C2), and battle space 
awareness. Table 1 shows the attributes used for the MDA assessment, however not all are used 
for each Assessment Area.  The principal indicators are Effectiveness and Military Utility.    
 
Table 1. MDA Capability Indicators (or Assessment Metrics). 
 
Area Effective Utility Area Effective 
Systems    Accessible  Improved Warfighter    
   Capable  Needed    Capable 
   Reliable  Applicable    Reliable 
    Usable  Wanted      
Operations  Accessible    Organization  Accessible 
   Capable      /Guidance  Capable 
   Reliable         
            Usable 
 
Specific measures and the type/s of data required to are defined for each of the capability 
indicators.  Examples are shown in Table 2 and the full list is contained in Appendix B. Metric 
Attributes are shown in bold and their measures in plain text. Use of the structure presented in 
Appendix A provides a consistent approach to MDA assessment and reporting across test venues 
that were used during 2008. This structure was used to correlate results from a variety of sources. 
Definitions of the attributes used in this assessment framework are found in Appendix C.   
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Table 2. Example of MDA Assessment Metrics: Assessment Area, Capability Indicators, 
and Metrics. (See Appendix B for complete set.)  
      Measure of Effectiveness   
System Performance    Capability      Metrics 
Assessment Area          Indicators 
  Technical 
Performance 
 
     Improved:      -5 to +5 rating of improvement over existing systems, by system 
                       aspect.  
Needed:         system fills a gap in existing capabilities, Y/N. 
Applicable:    system is applicable to MDA activities, by activity, Y/N. 
Wanted:        -5 to +5 rating of operator desire to have system available.  
   Information 
Retrieval 
Accessible: roll-up of information accessibility.   
      Available:      % of time information is available. 
Efficient:        number of steps to access information.  
    Capable: roll-up of capability to retrieve required information. 
      Sufficient:        % of information needed for assessment.  




Data were collected during multiple site visits and several Spiral-1 system test events.  
1. As part of the Workflow Analysis and Process Engineering Workshop (PEW) an 
overview of MDA activities was conducted during site visits to US Naval Forces Central 
Command (NAVCENT), ONI, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fifth Fleet, and Sixth Fleet. 
The objective was to document the way MDA is currently done and to identify where 
new technologies are expected to have the greatest impact. The workflow for MDA as 
currently executed was documented in these visits (Freeman, Gallup, MacKinnon, and 
Hutchins, (2008). The workflow was validated in the PEW held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 15-17 Jan 2008, and was mapped to the Maritime 
Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ w/MOC) core processes in a 
workshop in Norfolk, VA, in 29 January 2008.  
2. The Technical Risk Reduction Limited Objective Experiment was held at Space and 
Naval Systems Center (SPAWAR), Lab 140, San Diego, CA, 2-6 June 2008, and was the 
first simultaneous testing of multiple MDA technologies using Fleet participants. The 
objective was to go through the test procedure to identify potential problems, with 
technologies, methodology, scenario, and so on, prior to the primary test event. 
3. The Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) School, in San Diego, CA, was visited 19 
June 2008 to observe E-MIO usage and effectiveness. 
4. Trident Warrior 08 was held aboard multiple Navy ships to test approximately 100 newly 
developed technologies and policies, 15 Jun -15 July 2008. 
5. Empire Challenge 08 was held at China Lake Naval Station and in San Francisco Harbor 
as well as multiple other sites, 7-31 July 2008. 
6. FAIRGAME was held at simultaneous, multiple sites: Naval Maritime Intelligence 
Center (NMIC), NAVCENT, US Pacific Fleet Command (PACFLT), Maritime 
Intelligence Fusion Center, Pacific (MIFCPAC), MIFCLANT, SPAWAR Systems 
Center, San Diego (SSC-SD), and Naval Criminal Investigation NCIS), 15-18 July 2008, 




The data gathered in these venues were largely qualitative – including survey comments, chat 
logs, data collectors’ observations, and interview notes – though some quantitative survey data 
were also collected. As noted above, the data largely concerned the Spiral-1 systems evaluated in 
most of these venues however, data were also collected on other systems with potential MDA 
utility. In sum, the systems assessed were: CMA, E-MIO Wireless, FASTC2AP, Global Trader, 
Google Earth, LiNX, MAGNET, MASTER, MDA DS COI, MIDAS, PANDA, and Tripwire. 
 
Analysis Method 
Data were aggregated across all venues and each datum was assigned to one or more areas (e.g., 
System Performance) of the assessment framework (depicted in Appendix A) at the lowest level 
of detail (e.g., Technical Performance, or sub-sub-areas). Each item in each category was rated to 
indicate that it described a strength (score = 3), a concern (score = 2), or a deficiency (score = 1) 
in an MDA system, suite of systems, or deployment concept for systems. Items scored as 
concerns (2) were relatively minor or could be addressed through revisions to training or 
interface design. Items scored as deficiencies (1) concerned missing or inoperable functions 
critical to the MDA mission. Average scores were computed for each assessment area. These 
scores focused our interpretation of the qualitative data. We have given special emphasis to 
describing reported deficiencies.  
 
It is important to note that many of the reports are from a single source and, thus, may reflect the 
personal biases of those sources. Note also, that the quantitative findings reported here were 
developed by the NPS research team from qualitative reports, and thus reflect our interpretation 
rather than the interpretation of diverse operational experts or technology experts.  
 
In the next sections, we summarize our findings from each of the assessment areas. Following 
this, we present recommendations based on these findings, and then describe the findings in 
detail. 
 
Summary of MDA Capabilities Results  
This section presents a qualitative and quantitative summary of MDA capabilities within the 
assessment framework developed for this effort. It summarizes findings across the assessment 
venues. The data presented here comprise a compilation of 194 observations, warfighter 
comments, and survey results. These were each assigned to one or more of the relevant 
assessment sub-areas. Many items were placed in multiple categories, resulting in a total of 304 
assessments. Items were scored on the three-point scale described above. Average scores drove 
interpretation of the qualitative data.  
 
Results by Assessment Area 
The data generated across the MDA assessment venues focused on the use of MDA Spiral-1 
technologies for developing and tracking vessels of interest (VOIs) and conducting MIO 
operations. Accordingly, as depicted in Table 3, most of the data were categorized in the system 
performance assessment area (219 items) and the operations performance assessment area (70 
items). In both areas, the average assessment score was relatively high: 2.4 out of 3. No items 
concerned warfighter performance independent of the MDA technologies, and no assessment is 
made in this area. Only eight items concerned the organization/guidance assessment area, and 
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seven items concerned the system supportability and readiness area. Assessment scores were 
lowest in these low-frequency categories, largely due to overall concerns about the utility and 
supportability of new technologies from organizations being tasked with the new MDA mission. 
The frequency of reference to Spiral-1 and other MDA technologies is presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3.  Distribution of data by assessment area. 
 
Area Items Avg Score 
   Operations Performance 70 2.4 
   Organization/Guidance 8 2.1 
   System Performance 219 2.4 
   System Supportability and Readiness 7 2.0 
   Warfighter Performance  0 - 
Total / Average 304 2.4 
 
The data, which include warfighter comments, observations, interview notes, and survey results, 
specified 123 strengths of the tested MDA systems, 166 concerns, and 15 deficiencies, as 
displayed in Table 4. Ten deficiencies concerned System Performance, and five concerned 
Operations Performance. Because deficiencies are the most critical data, we address these in 
depth in the relevant assessment areas, below. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of data by score by assessment area. 
 
Count of Score Score    
Assessment Area 1: Deficiency 2: Concern 3: Strength Total 
   Operations Performance 5 33 32 70 
   Organization/Guidance  7 1 8 
   System Performance 10 119 90 219 
   System Supportability and    
   Readiness 
- 7 - 7 
Total 15 166 123 304 
 
We turn now to a qualitative assessment of each assessment area for which there was data. 
 
System Performance 
Of 219 items that concerned System Performance, 10 specified potential deficiencies regarding 
MDA system performance. Three of these concerned the inability to specify baselines against 
which to compare observed vessel behavior. Two items concerned perceived inadequacy of data 
quality and availability and two items concerned lack of connectivity of MIO technology. The 
remaining three items concerned specific features, data sharing, or security. Because deficiencies 
are particularly important in assessment, we present the detailed comments regarding potential 
deficiencies regarding system performance in Appendix D. 
 
Some 119 items expressed reparable concerns with MDA systems. By far the largest group of 
these (33 items) addressed the completeness, correctness, conflicts, and timeliness of data or data 
processing. Usability of maps, search, alerts, and other features was cited in 24 items. Some 20 
items addressed problems with training availability, fit to local needs, or speed. Operational 
utility was a concern in 7 cases, and the redundancy of technologies was an issue in 5 items.  




Of the 90 strengths cited regarding System Performance (Table 4) across the various types of 
data collected (i.e., operator comments, observations, and survey results), 27 concerned 
operational utility for VOI detection and tracking and for MIO operations. Usability of search, 
maps, and other features accounted for 18 items. The speed of training (6 items) was also an 
indirect validation of the usability of the technologies. Nine items concerned the value of data 
fusion capabilities of these technologies. The speed of the technologies was cited in 6 items. 
 
Operations Performance 
Of 70 items that concerned Operations Performance five were potential deficiencies (see 
Appendix E for a list of potential deficiencies regarding Operations Performance). All but one 
item concerned E-MIO connectivity (reception or transmission) problems. The remaining item 
concerned gaps in track coverage by CMA due to failures of CMA servers. (Note that one of the 
five items in the table in Appendix E was coded in two assessment categories). 
 
Of 33 items coded as concerns (i.e., a score of 2), the most frequent themes were the complete-
ness, correctness, conflicts, timeliness of data and data processing (12 items), usability (10 
items), and training (5 items). Of 32 items coded as strengths, 13 concerned operational utility 




No items concerned warfighter performance independent of the MDA technologies, and thus no 
assessment is made in this area. 
 
Organization/Guidance 
Very few items (8 out of a total of 304) concerned the assessment area of Organization and 
Guidance. Of these, none rose to the level of a potential deficiency. Seven items were coded as 
concerns. Two each concerned the constraints imposed by policies and agreements; coordination 
of MDA execution and ONI intelligence processes; and training. One addressed the challenge of 
customizing solutions to fit the local missions of organizations. One item, scored as a strength 
(i.e., a score of 3), concerned the alignment of MDA tasks with MHQ w/ MOC processes 
documented in the Process Alignment Workshop (Freeman, Heacox, & MacKinnon, 2008). 
 
System Supportability and Readiness 
Seven items addressed System Supportability and Readiness. All of these were areas of concern, 
either regarding the competency or size of staff (4 items), or potential deficiencies in infrastruc-
ture (2 items) or variance between facilities (1 item) that might hinder fielding and use of MDA 
solutions. 
 
Results by Assessment Sub-Area 
In this section, we summarize findings in each assessment sub-area. A summary of the results of 
the quantitative assessment is presented in Table 5, followed by a qualitative assessment that 
summarizes the strengths, concerns, and deficiencies observed in the various MDA assessment 
venues. Note, in the quantitative assessment, that areas of greatest concern (lowest average 
scores) were Operations Performance for MIO, several areas of Organization/Guidance 
(Guidance, MDA Compatibility, and System Management and Security), and System Support-
ability and Readiness. The most highly rated sub-areas were Operations Performance: Know-
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ledge Processes, Organization/Guidance: MHQ/MOC Compatibility, and System Performance: 
Operations Support. Finer-grained categorization, a synopsis, and a score for each item can be 
found in the complete report on this effort (MacKinnon, Hutchins, Schacher, & Freeman, 2008).            
 
Table 5.  Average assessment scores by sub-area. 
Assessment Sub-Area   Average score 
   Operations Performance: Knowledge Processes 2.5 
   Operations Performance: MIO 1.8 
   Organization/Guidance: Agreements 2.0 
   Organization/Guidance: Guidance 2.0 
   Organization/Guidance: MDA Compatibility 2.0 
   Organization/Guidance: MHQ/MOC Compatibility 2.5 
   System Performance: Automation 2.4 
   System Performance: Operations Support 2.5 
   System Performance: System Management and Security 2.0 
   System Performance: Technical Performance 2.3 
   System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance 2.4 




System Performance: Technical Performance 
Table 6 shows the majority of the 81 items concerning System Performance: Technical 
Performance involved Information Retrieval (54 items), all but 30 of which addressed concerns 
(i.e., score of 2) about the completeness, correctness, conflicts, timeliness of data and data 
processing. Usability strengths and concerns were the topic of 8 items. Also noted, with 5 items 
each, were data fusion (generally, a strength) and speed of data processing (which received 
mixed assessments). The remaining items addressed various issues. 
 
Table 6. Number of items concerning System Performance: Technical Performance. 
 
Sub-Sub-Area Total 
   System Performance: Technical Performance: Information Processing 1
   System Performance: Technical Performance: Information Retrieval 54
   System Performance: Technical Performance: Information Sharing 21
   System Performance: Technical Performance: Interoperability 5
Total 81
 
Also shown in Table 6, of the remaining items, 21 concerned Information Sharing. More 
specifically, 7 addressed the completeness, correctness, conflicts, timeliness of data and data 
processing. Three each concerned data sharing and transmission. Five items addressed 
Interoperability of systems. Of these items, three addressed requirements for specific software 
(e.g., Java, Direct-X), and two concerned the availability of data within or between nodes. One 
item addressed Information Processing, specifically the need for automated statistical analysis of 
data gaps to identify potential new sources of information and drive new collections. This 
capability – data-driven collection planning – is being developed in research efforts for ground 
warfare, and could be extended to MDA. 
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System Performance: Operations Support 
Of 21 items that concerned System Performance: Operations Support, 20 concerned the utility of 
specific technologies to operations. As indicated by comments included in Appendices D and E, 
E-MIO technology exhibited a potential deficiency with respect to connectivity. Most items in 
this area were strengths or concerns about the general value of these tools. One item concerned 
the lack of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and standard operating procedures (SOP) 
for applying MDA technologies.  
 
System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance 
Some 85 items addressed Warfighter Acceptance of specific technologies. Of these, 41 
concerned Human-System Interaction, the majority focusing on usability of agents, alerts, briefs, 
help, maps, menus, and search. Five of these concerned CMA’s data fusion capabilities, which 
were viewed as a strength in most cases. Training was addressed in 22 items, which was seen as 
fast but often incomplete. System Utility was addressed by 18 items, with an emphasis on 
acceleration of operational tasks, and benefits to situational awareness. However, MDA DS COI, 
LiNX, and Google Earth were each viewed once with concern (i.e., a score of 2) for being 
redundant with other solutions. Strategies for using the systems were seen to be lacking in four 
cases in an area we call System Usage. 
 
System Performance: Automation 
Automation was addressed in 27 items. Of these, 26 concerned Alerts, specifically their strong 
operational utility but mixed usability. One item, concerning Information Processing, addressed 
MASTER’s strong automation to capture data on VOIs, relative to current solutions. 
 
System Performance: System Management and Security 
Of five System Management and Security issues, 4 were concerns about keeping systems up and 
running, and one – a potential deficiency – concerned loss of the original security classification 
of information to be disseminated. 
 
Operations Performance: Knowledge Processes 
VOI Development was the focus of 52 of the 62 items concerning Operations Performance: 
Knowledge Processes. In this area, usability (17 items), operational utility (14 items), and the 
completeness, correctness, conflicts, timeliness of data and data processing were the most 
frequent topics. VOI Tracking accounted for the remaining 10 items, and similar concerns arose 
in this area; completeness, correctness, conflicts, timeliness of data and data processing (4 
items), and mixed usability (2 items) were the most frequently cited issues.  
 
Operations Performance: MIO 
In the area of MIO Execution, inadequate training was a concern in 3 of 8 cases; inadequate 
connectivity was a potential deficiency in 2.  
 
Organization/Guidance: MDA Compatibility 
The alignment of ONI with MDA activities was a concern in 2 items. 
 
Organization/Guidance: MHQ/MOC Compatibility 
Two items concerned compatibility of MDA and MHQ with MOC.  Process Alignment between 
MDA and MHQ with MOC was seen as a strength in one item, due to the Process Alignment 
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Workshop. However, local Organization Alignment with MDA, that is, the flexibility of MDA 
processes to local needs, was a concern in one case.  
 
Organization/Guidance: Agreements 
Two items concerned the assessment area Organization/Guidance: Agreements, and both were 
concerns (i.e., rating of 2) about restrictions imposed by data sharing agreements about classified 
information or data concerning U.S. citizens.  
 
Organization/Guidance: Guidance 
Two items specified concerns (i.e., rating of 2) about the need to develop better MDA CONOPS 
and TTP/SOP. 
 
System Supportability and Readiness 
Seven items concerned System Supportability and Readiness. Of these, 4 were concerns (i.e., 
rating of 2) about the number or competency of staff, and 3 identified concerns about the 
adequacy of infrastructure to support MDA technologies generally. 
 
Results by Technology 
In this section, we summarize the scores for each MDA technology cited in the findings – 
including Spiral-1 technologies and others – at the lowest assessment level. For further detail 
concerning each technology, we refer the reader to the sections below, in which we present 
findings in each of the assessment areas. 
 
The majority of the data gathered across venues concerned a specific technology (a total of 257 
items), usually CMA (136 items). A minority of the data concerned no specific MDA 
technology, or an unspecified suite of technologies (47 items) (see Table 7). Note that the list of 
technologies includes some systems that are not Spiral-1 products, but that were evaluated in the 
various MDA assessment venues. 
 
Those technologies that scored lowest, on the average (see Table 7), were Global Trader, for 
perceived incompleteness of data and lack of data replication; MAGNET, for lack of data due to 
data sharing agreements concerning U.S. citizens; MDA DS COI for lack of usability or training; 
and E-MIO wireless for connectivity problems. Those that scored highest were Tripwire, for its 
alerting and provision of contextual information, and PANDA, for the operational utility of alerts 
and quality of explanations of deviations that it presented. 
 
Table 7.  Distribution of data by technology. 
 
Technology Frequency Average Score 
    All Spiral-1 47 2.1 
    CMA 136 2.4 
    E-MIO Wireless 23 2.1 
    FASTC2AP 13 2.4 
    Global Trader 5 2.2 
    Google Earth 10 2.5 
    LiNX 5 2.4 
    MAGNET 2 2.0 
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    MASTER 33 2.3 
    MDA DS COI 5 2.0 
    MIDAS 5 2.6 
    PANDA 13 2.9 
    Tripwire 7 2.9 
Total/ Avg 304 2.4 
 
A more detailed assessment is presented in Appendix F, which contains the average assessment 
scores for MDA technologies at the finest level of assessment detail. 
 
To make a more focused assessment of the operational utility of systems, we computed the aver-
age sum of scores for strengths and concerns1 about systems. Several MDA technologies appear 
to have particularly high or low operational utility, based on this analysis (see Table 8). 
FASTC2AP, Global Trader, PANDA, Tripwire, and CMA received high marks for operational 
utility. MDA DS COI, E-MIO Wireless, and MAGNET received low marks for operational 
utility.  
 
Table 8.  Average Sum of Concern and Strength Scores by Technology. 
 
MDA Technology Avg Sum of Scores 
FASTC2AP 3.0 





Google Earth 2.5 
LiNX 2.3 
MDA DS COI 2.0 
E-MIO Wireless 1.5 
MAGNET n.a. 
 
An additional analysis was conducted to help the reader assess the impact of specific systems 
regarding fulfillment of MDA capability requirements (see Table 9). Spiral-1 technologies must 
help the Navy to fulfill several MDA capabilities: monitor, collect, fuse, analyze, and dissemi-
nate. One technology, E-MIO Wireless, has a low assessment score (Table 8, driven by connec-
tivity deficiencies) and it addresses only one MDA capability (i.e., collect). This should raise 
concern about the value of this technology, and focus investment (or disinvestment) decisions on 
it.   
 
Low assessment scores (of 2.0, or less), in Table 9, are also a concern with respect to MAGNET 
and MDA DS COI. However, these technologies address multiple MDA capabilities. Strengths 
in one area may compensate for concerns in others.  
                                                 
1 The value here is computed as the sum of all scores for concerns (each valued at 2 points) and strengths (3 points) 
divided by the total frequency of these scores for items in these categories: System Performance categories for 
Operations Support: System Utility, and Warfighter Acceptance: System Utility. Note that scores for potential 
deficiencies were excluded from this analysis, as were scores in all other assessment categories. 
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Note that all MDA capabilities are addressed by more than one technology. Thus, the issues 
identified with respect to any one technology do not necessarily indicate a capability gap. More 
specifically, three SP-1 technologies (CMA, MAGNET, and Tripwire) address all of these 
capabilities. Three technologies (Global Trader, DS/COI, and FASTC2AP) address most 
capabilities. Three technologies address only one capability (E-MIO: Collect; Google Earth: 
Disseminate; and LiNX: Collect). A finer-grained understanding of the implications of findings 
on MDA capabilities can be had by considering the mapping of technologies to the performance 
thresholds that each technology must achieve, as presented in Appendix H. 
 
Table 9.  Mapping of SP-1 Technologies to MDA Capabilities. 
 












2.4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.4 
  Monitor X  X   X X X X 
  Collect X X X  X X X X X 
  Fuse X     X  X X 
  Analyze X  X   X X X  
  Disseminate X  X X  X X X X 
 
MDA Capabilities Recommendations 
 
In this section, we make recommendations based on the findings, discussed in previous sections. 
Recommendations concern fielding and support, technology usability, technology functionality, 
data quality, training, organizational interoperability, and future MDA assessment activity. These 
recommendations are organized into three categories of the assessment framework, and an 
additional category concerning the programmatics of MDA assessment. 
 
System Supportability and Readiness 
 
Strong technologies: PEO C4I and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) should 
press forward with development and fielding of several technologies that received high marks for 
operational utility: FASTC2AP, Global Trader, PANDA, Tripwire, and CMA.2 
 
Weaker technologies: OPNAV should evaluate the expressed concerns, deficits, and return on 
investments for several technologies that received low marks for operational utility: MDA DS 
COI, E-MIO Wireless, and MAGNET. 
 
Fielding sites: OPNAV should consider placing technologies in reach-back facilities (e.g., at 
ONI rather than at NAVCENT) with robust technical support and operator competence for those 
technologies that have high utility but low accuracy, reliability, or usability. 
 
                                                 
2 This list was determined by computing the average weighted sum of scores for items in two categories concerning 
operational utility: System Performance categories for Operations Support: System Utility, and Warfighter 
Acceptance: System Utility. Scores for potential deficiencies were excluded from this analysis. 
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Fielding/support process: OPNAV and PEO C4I should ensure and advertise competent fielding 
and support for MDA technologies. This may involve educating these organizations about the 
processes for surveying infrastructure (e.g., the adequacy of power supplies and server space), 
configuring or customizing technologies to local needs, specifying technical support 




Usability: OPNAV and PEO C4I should systematically analyze the usability of MDA 
technologies – specifically programmable agents, maps, search features, graphs, alerts, and 
briefing products – to ensure that (1) the cost in errors and response time is estimated, (2) design 
modifications are prioritized accordingly and are funded, and (3) training enables operators to 
work around persistent usability problems. In MDA assessment events, CMA, MASTER, 
FASTC2AP, MDA DS COI, and E-MIO all had usability issues that raised concern. 
 
Redundant functionality: OPNAV and PEO C4I should evaluate reports of redundancy of MDA 
technologies with each other and with existing systems. Fielding decisions, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs), and training should resolve these redundancies.  
 
Baseline specification functions: OPNAV and PEO C4I should ensure that technologies with 
alert/alarm capabilities enable the user to specify baseline behaviors for traffic in different 
regions. Without this function, alerts lose much of their value.  
 
Data sources: OPNAV should identify, develop, and link to critical data sources. For example, 
data sharing agreements are required to provide data concerning U.S. persons. 
 
Data source education: OPNAV and PEO C4I should ensure operators of new systems 
understand which data sources feed those systems, the reliability of those sources, which 
expected data sources do not feed those systems, and the implications of both for analyzing 
results. These explanations should identify the reason for data gaps, e.g., lack of institutional or 
international agreements to access data, lack of a connection to the data source, lack of data 
replication, or data loss during system failures. In MDA assessment events, unreliable sources or 
systems produced gaps in CMA track coverage; lack of data replication produced incomplete 
data in Global Trader; connectivity issues hindered use of E-MIO (e.g., below decks); and 
MAGNET data were sparse per policies about handling data concerning U.S. persons.  
 
Common Data: OPNAV should analyze and resolve significant differences in data sets between 
users who must coordinate their activities. 
 
Training: OPNAV should implement a dedicated course of instruction concerning MDA TTPs, 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the role of MDA technologies in them, and include it 
in the Navy Training System Plan (NTSP). Ideally, this training will be customized to local 




Process interoperability: OPNAV should evaluate and revise the emerging process architectures 
for MHQ with MOC, ONI, and other organizations to ensure they support MDA tasks, and they 
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can be customized to the conditions of MDA work in the varied Navy areas of operations. This 
analysis may entail developing MDA use cases or scenarios against which to test process 
architectures, and these use cases can serve double duty as exercise and training scenarios. 
 
Information flow impedance: OPNAV and PEO C4I should assess the impact of new 
technologies, procedures, and organizational structures on the rate of information flow between 
organizations, and between elements of organizations. New technologies have the potential to 
raise the information output of some organizations (e.g., ONI) well above the input and 




MDA operational baseline: To estimate the return on investment in MDA systems requires that 
we define the baseline of MDA capabilities (e.g., the number of VOIs developed and tracked per 
unit time). This baseline might be estimated by operational experts.  However, more reliable data 
will be obtained from direct observation of the effectiveness of current, fielded technologies for 
MDA missions. We recommend that observational data be gathered concerning the current MDA 
baseline.  
 
MDA system alternatives: The return on investment for MDA assessment may be increased if 
experimentation and observation address some promising systems outside the Spiral-1 suite. 
Such systems include CMA, NEPTUNE3, GALE-Lite, Palaemon, PANDA, and Sea Watch. 
Evaluation of such systems is essentially a high-risk/high-return investment in the portfolio of MDA 
assessment activities.  
 
MDA assessment scenarios: OPNAV and PEO C4I should develop exercises that train and test 
MDA capabilities (technologies, TTPs, organizations, etc.), with a particular focus on handling 
realistic numbers of white vessels. Design these exercises to answer at least these questions: Can 
we develop a VOI and identify it among many vessels almost identical to it? Can we communi-
cate securely and confidentially with a single ship among many ships in an area? Can we 
coordinate our actions in a crowded field of internationally flagged white vessels? Can we 
manage and address costs of delay to commercial shipping (estimated by NORTHCOM at 
$10,000/hour) and erroneous actions (e.g., damage or destruction of internationally flagged 
vessels)? 
 
MDA process modeling: OPNAV should ensure that future assessments use measures that 
support computational, “what if” modeling of the impact of new technologies, processes, 
manning, and organizational structures. Such measures should represent the speed-accuracy 
tradeoff curve for analysis, decision making, and action (throughput) given varied missions, staff 
size and competency, and related factors. By reusing these measurements in models, the Navy 
will multiply the answers it can extract from scant assessment data, and thus increase its return 
on every dollar spent on assessment. 
 
System Performance Results 
The assessment area System Performance concerns the performance of MDA technologies, 
including Spiral-1 technologies. The components of this assessment area concern the technical 
                                                 
3 NEPTUNE, GALE-Lite, Palaemon, and PANDA are systems being developed to support MDA missions that are 
not part of the Spiral-1 set of technologies.  
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performance of systems, the support they provide to operations, warfighter acceptance of the 
systems, automation of important functions, and system management and security.  
 
Organization/Guidance Results 
The assessment area Organization/Guidance concerns the alignment of organizations to MDA 
missions, the alignment of MDA processes or tasks with those specified in the MHQ with MOC 
process architecture the alignment of international and inter-organization agreements with MDA 
mission requirements, and the availability of CONOPS, TTPs, SOP, and standing orders for 
MDA missions. The key data concerning this assessment area are presented in Appendix H. 
 
Observer Log Results  
The following results are for CMA, except where noted.  
 
Information Acquisition Times – When data on information acquisition times was collected, 
although the systems were not being used in an operational environment, the amount of time 
required to obtain information was viewed as representative of what would be observed in 
operational environments. Very little time was required, e.g., 1 min to determine when a 
specified ship was built after the White Cell request for information; 7 min to determine a 
person-of-interest was not on the reported ship; 2 min to identify the type of cargo on a named 
ship; 10 min to locate a ship and identify its origin and anticipated arrival locations; and, 6 min 
to locate a ship, details on type and crew.  
 
It is possible that these times are biased to shorter time because historical data was used for 
which the needed data was known to be present.  Even so, these information acquisition times 
represent an improvement over existing times.  
 
System Performance – Most system problems encountered were due to the lab environment and 
do not qualify as Spiral-1 system results. The following results are inherent to the systems, not 
the lab environment. These results are derived from limited tests of the systems and have not 
been validated. (1) Partial match did not work as anticipated when searching for a ship name. (2) 
Operators could not zoom in and draw a small geographical box around a VOI.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Most of the data reported here describe strengths or concerns of MDA systems. Few users 
identified deficiencies in these systems. The scores indicate all of the assessed technologies 
increased the warfighter’s effectiveness to some degree, yet there was little information about the 
level of enhancement of MDA capabilities provided by the suite of Spiral-1 systems due to the 
lack of data on baseline levels of performance.  
 
Specifically, in the quantitative assessment, areas of greatest concern (lowest average scores) were: 
 Operations Performance for EMIO*  
 Several sub-areas of Organization/Guidance concerning MDA Compatibility 
(specifically, alignment of MDA activity with ONI)  
 Guidance (especially the need for MDA CONOPS, TTPs, and SOPs) 
 Agreements (concerning data sharing) 
 System Management 
 Security 
 System Supportability 
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*Assessment for EMIO was obtained through an actual operational experiment, not a system 
test. This differs from the rest of the results which were obtained from structured laboratory 
events. 
 
The most highly rated sub-areas were: 
 Operations Performance concerning Knowledge Processes for vessel of interest 
(VOI ) development and tracking 
 Organization/Guidance concerning Maritime Headquarters with Maritime 
Operations Center (MHQ/MOC) Compatibility with MDA 
 System Performance concerning the Operations Support provided by these 
systems.   
Finer categorization, a synopsis, and a score for each item are presented in the technical report on 
this effort (MacKinnon, Hutchins, Schacher, & Freeman, 2008).  
 
Future Assessment Recommendations 
 
We recommend that observations be conducted to establish a baseline on MDA capabilities 
using current systems, in order to better estimate the impact of Spiral-1 systems. We recommend 
that some experimentation and observation address other technologies that show promise to 
improve MDA effectiveness. Such systems include CMA, NEPTUNE, GALE-Lite, Palaemon, 
PANDA, and Sea Watch. OPNAV and PEO C4I should develop exercises that train and test 
MDA capabilities (technologies, TTPs, organizations, etc.), with a particular focus on handling 
realistically large numbers of cooperative, intentionally uncooperative, and inattentive white 
vessels. Finally, we advise OPNAV to ensure future assessments capture data that support 
computational, “what if” modeling of the impact of new technologies, processes, manning, and 
organizational structures. Such measurements will enable the Navy to reuse scant data 
productively and in a predictive manner, thus multiplying the return on each assessment dollar.
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Appendix A:  MDA Assessment Areas and Structure 
 
 
System Performance  Operations Performance 
  Technical Performance    Knowledge Processes 
   Information Retrieval    Information Retrieval 
   Information Processing    VoI Development 
   Information Sharing    VoI Tracking 
   Operator Configurable    Information Sharing 
    Interoperability   ISR 
  Operations Support    Planning 
   System Utility    Execution 
    Standards and Guidelines    PED 
  Warfighter Acceptance   MIO 
   System Utility    Planning 
   Human-System Interaction    Execution 
   System Usage    Assessment 
    System Training     
  Automation  Organization/Guidance 
   Alerts   MDA Compatibility 
   Information Processing    Organization Alignment 
    Smart Pull    Process Alignment 
  System Management and Security   MHQ/MOC Compatibility 
      Organization Alignment 
Warfighter Performance    Process Alignment 
  MDA Mission   Agreements 
   Mission Understanding    Information Sharing 
    Mission Acceptance    Shared Operations 
  Unit Performance   Guidance 
   Manning    CONOPS 
   Activities    TTP/SOP 
    Training    Standing Orders 
  Human Performance     
   Tasks  System Supportability and Readiness 
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Appendix B:  MDA Assessment Areas and Associated Metrics 
 
This table presents the measures that are to be evaluated for each Assessment Area.  Attributes are in 
bold, followed by their associated measures.    
 
       MDA Assessment Metrics 
   
 MOE   
     MOP or MOU 
Spiral-1 System Performance (each system) 
  Technical Performance 
       Improved: -5 to +5 rating of improvement over existing systems, by system aspect.  
Needed: system fills a gap in existing capabilities, Y/N. 
Applicable: system is applicable to MDA activities, by activity, Y/N. 
Wanted: -5 to +5 rating of operator desire to have system available.  
   Information  Accessible: roll-up of information accessibility.   
   Retrieval   Available: % of time information is available. 
Efficient: number of steps to access information.  
    Capable: roll-up of capability to retrieve required information. 
      Sufficient: % of information needed for assessment.  
Timely: time required to retrieve information.  
    Reliable: roll-up of ability to obtain correct information when needed.  
      Assured: information source is identified, Y/N. 
Robust: automatic failover during system problems, Y/N; database backup, Y/N. 
Persistent: % of time down due to system failure. 
    Usable: roll-up of information usability for assessment and decision-making.  
       Clear: 1-5 rating of information clarity; 1-5 rating of GUI presentation.  
Trusted: 1-5 rating of confidence in information.  
   Information  Capable: roll-up of ability to process ship and VoI information.  
   Processing   Available: information processing capabilities, Y/N; list capabilities. 
Efficient: use of information processing capabilities, by capability, Y/N.  
Sufficient: information processing capabilities for operations needs, Y/N.  
Automatic: automatic information processing available? Y/N 
   Information  Accessible: roll-up of information sharing accessibility.  
   Sharing   Compatible: M2M interoperability, by system, Y/N.  
Available: % of time information sharing available.  
Efficient: information sharing efficient, Y/N; number of steps required to share information.  
    Capable: collaboration capabilities provided, Y/N; roll-up of capability to share information with other 
units. 
      Reach: number of units with which information can be shared; number of units per collaboration 
session.  
Sufficient: % of required units with which information can be shared; % of required information 
that can be shared.  
Timely: time required to exchange information.  
   Operator  Capable: 1-5 rating of the ability of operator to configure the system as desired.  
   Configurable   Flexible: Operator can configure information search, information presentation, Y/N. 
Sufficient: fraction of required profile types that can be developed.  
Reach: Number of profiles that can be saved.  
Efficient: 1-5 rating of system configuration efficiency; number of steps required to configure 
system, by configuration type.  
    Interoperability   Compatible: M2M system interoperability, by system, Y/N;  
information formats compatibility, by system, Y/N. 
  Operations Support 
   System Utility   Improved: -5 to +5 rating of improvement of MDA operation activities over existing systems, by 
activity.  
Needed: system fills a gap in existing support to MDA operations, Y/N. 
Applicable: system is applicable to MDA activities, by activity, Y/N. 
Wanted: -5 to +5 rating of operations center desire to have system available.  
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   Standards and Usable: roll-up assessment of Standards and Guidelines for system usage.  
   Guidelines   Sufficient: % of system operations covered by guidelines; standards to cover information 
formats, Y/N; standards to cover M2M interactions, Y/N.  
Clear: guidelines to direct system operation, Y/N.  
      Prepare a list of those situations for which Standards/Guidelines are inadequate.  
  Warfighter Acceptance 
   System Utility   Improved: -5 to +5 rating of improvement of operator's task performance over existing systems, 
by task.  
Needed: system fills a gap in existing support to task performance, Y/N. 
Applicable: system is applicable to MDA tasks, by task, Y/N. 
Wanted: -5 to +5 rating of operator desire to have system available.  
   Human-System Usable: 1-5 scale roll-up of human-system-interaction.  
   Interaction   Clear: 1-5 scale on GUI presentation. 
Manageable: GUI can be configured to operator desired presentation, Y/N. 
Relevant: information presented is relevant to operator task performance, Y/N. 
Timely: GUI layout and information presentation facilitates rapid retrieval of needed information, 
Y/N; time to retrieve needed information.  
Efficient: number of steps required to retrieve needed information; 1-5 scale on GUI facilitation 
of information retrieval efficiency. 
   System Usage   Prepare a table of frequency of Spiral-1 system use, by situation and by task.  
   System Training Usable: 1-5 scale roll-up of training quality.   
     Clear: 1-5 scale on training clarity. 
Sufficient: 1-5 scale on sufficiency of training to prepare operator for tasks. 
Relevant: 1-5 scale on whether training is relevant to mission and workflow.  
  Automation 
   Alerts Capable: alerts are provided, Y/N; roll-up of quality of alerts.  
      Automatic:  
Flexible: alerts operator configurable, Y/N; number of different types of alerts available.  
Trusted: 1-5 rating of alerts eliminating need to monitor situation.  
Sufficient: % of needed alerts provided by system, % of needed alert types provided by system. 
Timely: alerts provided in time to take needed actions, Y/N.  
     Efficient: 1-5 rating of efficiency setting up alerts; number of steps required to set up alerts.  
   Information 
Processing 
Capable: machine assisted information processing provided, Y/N; system automated information 
processing available, Y/N; roll-up assessment of information processing capability.   
       Automatic: hands-off information processing available, Y/N. 
Flexible: system information processing operator configurable, Y/N. 
Trusted: 1-5 rating of ability to accept hands-off information processing.  
Sufficient: % of information processing requirements performed by system.  
   Smart Pull Capable: smart pull capable, Y/N.   
        Automatic: smart pull automatic updates, Y/N.    
Flexible: smart pull operator configurable, Y/N; number of different types of smart pull available.
Trusted: 1-5 rating of smart pull reliability to provide required information.  
Sufficient: % of required information available by smart pull.   
  System Management and Security 
    Accessible: roll up of system management functions for overall accessibility.  List any significant 
causes for lack in accessibility.  
     Reliable: % of time system is down.  
Secure: % of attacks that disrupt system performance.  
Manageable: time required to repair/reconfigure system after failure.  
Sufficient: information in status reports to manage system, Y/N. 
Accurate: % of system status reports that are correct.  
Operations Performance 
  Knowledge Processes 
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   Information 
Retrieval 
  Accurate: % of retrieved information that conforms to ground truth.  
Flexible: number of sources that can be accessed to provide information, by information type. 
Sufficient: information available to assess vessels in AoR; information available to conduct MDA 
operations;  
Timely: time to retrieve information, by information type; information in time to take needed 
actions.  
Efficient: 1-5 rating of information retrieval efficiency, by information type; Number of steps 
required to retrieve information, by information type. 
   VoI  
Development 
  Accurate: % of correct assessments of vessel classification, threat.  
Timely: time to complete VoI assessment and classification.  
   VoI Tracking Capable: 1-5 rating of ability to track vessels; roll-up summary of vessel tracking capabilities.  
       Accurate: mean vessel location error, by vessel type.  
Flexible: number of different types of vessels that can be tracked by (radiating, AIS, etc) 
Reach: geographical area over which tracking can be accomplished.  
Sufficient: % of AOR over which tracking can be accomplished.   
Timely: time to locate vessel; frequency of vessel reports.  
   Information 
Sharing 
Capable: collaboration capabilities provided, Y/N; roll-up of capability to share information with other 
units. 
      Reach: number of units with which information can be shared; number of units per collaboration 
session.  
Sufficient: % of required units with which information can be shared; % of required information 
that can be shared.  
Timely: time required to exchange information, ops centers and reachback.  
      Compatible: system interoperability, Y/N; information formats, by unit, Y/N. 
    Accessible: roll-up of information sharing accessibility.  
      Compatible: M2M interoperability, by system, Y/N.  
Available: % of time information sharing available.  
Efficient: information sharing efficient, Y/N; number of steps required to share information.  
  ISR    
   Planning   Sufficient: % of RFIs addressed; % of available assets assigned. 
Timely: time to plan; planning completed in time for execution.  
   Execution   Accurate: % of assets conforming to planed actions. 
Sufficient: % of assets completing assignment.  
    PED   Accurate: % of assessments conforming to ground truth. 
Timely: time to complete processing, exploitation, distribution; distribution in time to meet 
planning cycle.   
  MIO    
   Planning   Sufficient: % of RFIs addressed; % of available assets assigned. 
Timely: time to plan; planning completed in time for execution.  
   Execution   Accurate: % of assets conforming to planed actions. 
Sufficient: % of assets completing assignment.  
    Assessment   Accurate: % of assessments conforming to ground truth. 
Timely: time to complete reachback, personnel assessment, ship threat assessment.   
Warfighter Performance 
  MDA Mission    
   Mission 
Understanding 
  Clear: 1-5 rating of understanding of activities and tasks, by position.  
    Mission 
Acceptance 
  Clear:  
Compliant: 1-5 rating of individual, unit readiness to undertake MDA mission, by position.  
Compatible: 1-5 rating on fit and ability to perform MDA tasks with other duties; percent of 
current tasks that match MDA needs.  
  Unit Performance 
   Manning   Sufficient: manning to carry out assigned activities, Y/N, % of required. 
Compatible: personnel assigned with activity requirements, Y/N, % match.  
   Activities Capable: 1-5 rating of unit ability to undertake assigned MDA activities.  
       Timely: time to complete activities.  
Compliant: activity performance complies with CONOPS, rules, agreements, Y/N. 
Flexible: 1-5 rating of unit's ability to respond to different situations. 
   Training   Sufficient: 1-5 rating of training preparation to perform required activities, by activity and unit.  
Relevant: 1-5 rating of training relevance to assigned activities, by activity and unit.  
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  Human Performance 
   Tasks Capable: 1-5 rating of human ability to perform MDA tasks, by position. 
       Timely: time to complete tasks.  
Flexible: respond to situation. 
   Training   Sufficient: 1-5 rating of training preparation to perform required activities, by task and position.  
Relevant: 1-5 rating of training relevance to assigned activities, by task and position.  
Organization/Guidance 
  MDA Compatibility 
   Organization Capable: roll-up of fit of the organization's structure to MDA requirements.  
   Alignment   Sufficient: rolls and decision making agreements to cover MDA contingencies, Y/N.  
Compatible: organization alignment with MDA operations requirements, Y/N. 
Flexible: MDA responsible units can realign in response to situation, Y/N. 
Timely: organizations are self-synchronizing in response to situation, Y/N; time required to 
synchronize operations.  
    Usable: roll-up of how workable organization alignment is to accomplish the MDA mission.  
       Clear: responsibilities and command relations between MDA units, Y/N. 
Trusted: partner units to carry out their responsibilities without question, Y/N.  
Manageable: information and decision flow between units, Y/N. 
   Process  Capable: roll-up of how capable MDA units are of sharing activities/tasks.  
   Alignment   Sufficient: information sharing agreements to cover MDA contingencies, Y/N.  
Compatible: process is in alignment with MDA operations requirements, Y/N; information 
sharing between MDA units, Y/N. 
Flexible: MDA processes can realign in response to situation, Y/N. 
Timely: processes are self-synchronizing in response to situation, Y/N; time required to 
synchronize processes.  
Automatic: information sharing between MDA units, Y/N. 
    Usable: roll-up of how workable activity/task sharing is between MDA units.  
        Clear: information sharing processes, Y/N; activity/task execution processes, Y/N.  
Trusted: partner units to carry out their responsibilities without question, Y/N; information 
provided by partner units, Y/N.  
Manageable: information and workflow between units, Y/N. 
  MHQ/MOC Compatibility 
   Organization Capable: roll-up of fit of MDA unit’s structure to MHQ/MOC.  
   Alignment   Sufficient: agreements to cover MDA contingencies, Y/N.  
Compatible: organization alignment with MDA operations requirements, Y/N. 
Flexible: MHQ/MOC and MDA units can realign in response to situation, Y/N. 
Timely: organizations are self-synchronizing in response to situation, Y/N; time required to 
synchronize operations.  
    Usable: roll-up of how workable alignment of MHQ/MOC with MDA units is to accomplish the MDA 
mission.  
       Clear: responsibilities and command relations between MDA units, Y/N. 
Trusted: partner units to carry out their responsibilities without question, Y/N.  
Manageable: information and decision flow between units, Y/N. 
   Process  Capable: roll-up of how capable MDA units are of sharing activities/tasks.  
   Alignment   Sufficient: information sharing agreements to cover MDA contingencies, Y/N; % of MDA 
activities that map to MHQ/MOC activities.   
Compatible: processis alignment of MHQ/MOC and MDA operations requirements, Y/N; 
information sharing between MHQ/MOC and MDA units, Y/N; % of activities that can seamlessly 
share information, workflow, and responsibilities.  
Flexible: MHQ/MOC and MDA processes can realign in response to situation, Y/N. 
Timely: MHQ/MOC and MDA processes are self-synchronizing in response to situation, Y/N; 
time required to synchronize processes.  
Automatic: information sharing between MHQ/MOC and MDA units, Y/N. 
    Usable: roll-up of how workable activity/task sharing is between MHQ/MOC and MDA units.  
        Clear: information sharing processes, Y/N; activity/task execution processes, Y/N.  
Trusted: MHQ/MOC to carry out their responsibilities without question, Y/N; information provided 
by MHQ/MOC, Y/N.  
Manageable: information and workflow between MHQ/MOC and MDA units, Y/N. 
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  Agreements    
   Information 
Sharing 
  Reach: Number of different types of information that can be shared.  
Sufficient: % of required information that can be shared.   
Compliant: with information security regulations, Y/N; list barriers to information sharing that 
impede MDA operations.  
    Shared 
Operations 
  Clear: responsibilities, chain of command. 
Sufficient: % of required units/organizations participating.  
Reach: number of MDA activities that can have shared participation, by activity, list activities, 
and list participating units.   
  Guidance    
   CONOPS Usable: roll-up assessment of CONOPS quality to guide MDA operations.  
      Sufficient: guidance to conduct MDA, by operation, Y/N.  
Relevant: guidance applies to MDA, by situation, Y/N.   
Applicable: guidance can be applied, by situation, Y/N.  
Clear: guidance to direct activities, by activity, Y/N.  
Compliant: with higher-order directives/doctrine, Y/N.   
       Prepare a list of those situations for which CONOPS is inadequate.  
   TTP/SOP Usable: roll-up assessment of TTP/SOP quality to direct MDA activities.  
      Sufficient: guidance to conduct MDA, by activity, Y/N.  
Relevant: guidance applies to MDA, by activity, Y/N.   
Applicable: guidance can be applied, by situation, Y/N.  
Clear: guidance to direct activities, by activity, Y/N.  
Compliant: with higher-order directives, Y/N.   
      Prepare a list of those situations for which TTP/SOP are inadequate.  
   Standing 
Orders 
Usable: roll-up assessment of Standing Orders (ROE, NSL, commander's guidance, etc.) quality to 
frame MDA operations.  
  
      Sufficient: guidance to conduct MDA, by operation, Y/N.  
Relevant: guidance applies to MDA, by situation, Y/N.   
Applicable: guidance can be applied, by situation, Y/N.  
Clear: guidance to direct MDA operations, by activity, Y/N.  
Compliant: with higher-order directives, Y/N.   
 
   
 
25
Appendix C:  Attribute Definitions 
 
Effective – Effective is an overarching attribute.  It refers to how well systems, people, and 
processes meet their stated purposes.  This attribute has meaning only in reference to that 
purpose.  E.g., it is not sufficient to state that a system is effective without also stating at what.   
 
Accessible – Users have access to needed capabilities and information.  This includes access to 
communication means, data and processed information, systems, software, support, etc.  Access 
will often be through a network.  This attribute is one of the four MOEs its component MOP 
follows.   
Capacity – Number of users that can have access; number of services that can be 
provided; capacity of other systems required for its function, primarily bandwidth.  
Included is information or service throughput.  
Available – System or capability is ready for use, can be used, when needed.  It is 
possible that a capability can be accessed but cannot be used at that time.  
Compatible – The system or capability can function with other elements external to it 
without modification to either.  It can be integrated with other systems or capabilities.  
This can also refer to processes or organizations being compatible or integrated.  
Extensive – The system or capability is capable of servicing a large number of users, 
covers a large geographical area, services a large number of user types, and provides a 
number of different types of service.   
Efficient – The number of steps or effort needed to access and use the service is 
acceptable.  This attribute is inherently comparative.  Acceptable normally refers to a 
standard, or an improvement over what was formerly required.  Efficiency can be a ratio, 
a judgment of (result obtained)/(effort required). 
 
Reliable –The capability or information is there when needed, can be depended on.  Human and 
organization reliability is included.  This attribute is one of the four MOE; its component MOP 
follows.   
Robust – The system or process is able to withstand stress or attack.  Changes in 
environment are managed with minimal loss of functionality or effectiveness.   
Persistent – The system maintains its status over long periods of time (primarily ISR 
capabilities).  Information maintains its content and meaning across processing and 
distribution means (e.g., tracks).   
Secure – The system, process, information, has provisions that prevent unauthorized use, 
intrusion, or tampering.   
Assured – Information is warranted to be correct, the source identified, and non-
repudiation in effect.  The process is warranted to produce the desired result.   
 
Capable – The system, capability, person, or organization provides the needed services.  This 
attribute is one of the four MOE; its component MOP follows.       
Sufficient – What has been provided/received is adequate for the recipient to perform 
their function.  For humans and organizations, the skills available are adequate for task 
performance.  Sufficiency can refer to either quantity or level.  
Flexible – The system, process, human, or organization responds easily to the situation or 
to changing requirements.  It is adaptable, can handle/utilize a wide range of types.  It is 
tailorable/customizable to user needs and/or users can make modifications to suite their 
needs.  
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Accurate – Information provided is correct, matches reality within acceptable limits.  
Determinations of accuracy normally require definition of acceptable error limits. 
Timely – The occurrence or delivery is within acceptable time limits.  This can refer to 
an elapsed time or to meeting a schedule.  
 
Usable – The system, capability, information, or process can be used.  This attribute is one of the 
four MOE; its component MOP follows.   
Clear – How the system or process is to be used is easily understood.  Meaning of the 
information is easily comprehended.  Instructions, guidelines, definitions are complete 
and meaningful.  
Trusted – Users believe that the information, process, system, organization, will perform 
their function in a manner that supports current needs.   
Manageable – The system or process can be easily modified or manipulated as needs 
dictate, often in response to changes in the environment.  Included is insuring that the 
required level of performance is maintained.  This includes installation of capabilities.   
Relevant – Information provided applies to the current situation.  System capabilities are 
what is needed for current tasks. Processes provide the actions required for current 
operations.  
Compliant – The system or information complies with standards or defined structure and 
formats.  Activities are in conformance with existing CONOPS and TTP.   
 
Military Utility – Military utility the second overarching attribute, and actually is a faux attribute, 
not actually a description of characteristics but a determination to be made in Military Utility 
Assessments (MUA).  It is used to express that something does/does not contribute to the 
successful performance of military operations.  It is one of the most important considerations for 
military operations.  The four measures of utility (MOU) follow.   
Improved – The system, organization, or process improves the conduct of military 
operations for which they were designed.   
Needed – The system, organization, or process fills a gap an identified gap.   
Applicable – The system, organization, or process is pertinent to conduct of the 
operation.  Its capabilities match the needs and conduct of the operation.  
Wanted – Operational personnel want the capability and utilize it.  They do not currently 
have the capability or would rather use it in place of other available capabilities.  
 
Ready  Ready is an official procurement term that refers to the system being ready for fielding.  
As indicated, it is a roll-up of the other fundamental measures and the life-cycle plan (which 
includes a personnel plan).   
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Appendix D:  Potential Deficiencies regarding System Performance 
 
Sub-Sub-Area Technology Item 
System Performance:  
System Management 
and Security 
CMA CMA: Users sometimes lost track of the original security 
classification of the information they wished to disseminate.  This 
increased the likelihood of a security violation as a result of passing 




Google Earth Google Earth has no embedded collaboration tool included, thus it 




All Spiral-1 Spiral-1 did not automatically establish or display threat assignments 





Spiral-1 tools did not provide additional capability to establish 
baseline normal civil maritime operations worldwide and threat 
assessment criteria.  CMA and FASTC2AP could alert based upon a 
geographic point/area/proximity, but did not support alerts 






Tactical EMIO System (TES) - Although wireless, the TED devices 
were required to be in the vicinity of the Tactical EMIO Maritime PC 
(TEMP) in order to download data captured during the boarding. The 
radio frequency (RF) signals were not strong enough to transmit data 
when team members were below decks.  (Visit, Board, Search and 






Tactical EMIO System (TES) - While mobility of the Tactical EMIO 
Device (TED) was a clear advantage, enabling the collection of data 
from multiple locations within the vessel, one limitation noted was 
that the TED must be within the vicinity of the TEMP to download 
the data captured.  The RF signals were not strong enough to 
transmit data when team members were below decks. The Maritime 
BGAN EMIO Terminal (MBET) device, in turn, failed to transfer 
data due to environmental issues and weak RF signal range of the 
commercial satellite.  Contractors eventually departed the target 
vessel and drove inland with the TEMP and MBET device to acquire 
a stronger signal. The MBET link was then acquired and successfully 
transmitted data from the TEMP device. Contractors asserted that the 
satellite connectivity will not be a concern in the current AOR. Also, 
the boarding officer was not able to demonstrate the transfer of data 
via the Maritime Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) EMIO 
Terminal (MBET) due to the satellite connectivity. (VBSS School) 
System Performance: 
Automation: Alerts 
All Spiral-1 The ability to capture and store baseline/normal maritime movement 
patterns was not observed.  Spiral-1 tools did not alert users to 





CMA The user’s ability to monitor vessel, person, and cargo data was 
severely degraded by gaps in track data coverage.  When a node’s 
CMA server was down, or data was not transmitted, the data not 
received was not recoverable.  The Naval Research Laboratory limited 
the National Technical Means data source input to CMA to 14 hours 
per day and filtered the data that was provided.  This resulted in a gap 




All Spiral-1 There were significant differences in information available at 
different nodes.  
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Appendix E:   Potential Deficiencies regarding Operations Performance 
 
Sub-Sub-Area Technology Item 
Operations Performance: 
Knowledge Processes: 





TES - While mobility of the Tactical EMIO Device 
(TED) was a clear advantage, enabling the collection 
of data from multiple locations within the vessel, one 
limitation noted was that the TED must be within the 
vicinity of the TEMP to download the data captured.   
Although wireless, the TED devices were required to 
be in the vicinity of the TEMP in order to download 
data captured during the boarding. The radio 
frequency (RF) signals were not strong enough to 
transmit data when team members were below decks. 
The MBET device, in turn, failed to transfer data due 
to environmental issues and weak RF Signal range of 
the commercial satellite.  Contractors eventually 
departed the target vessel and drove inland with the 
TEMP and MBET device to acquire a stronger signal. 
The MBET link was then acquired and successfully 
transmitted data from the TEMP device. Contractors 
asserted that the satellite connectivity will not be a 
concern in the current AOR. Also, the boarding 
officer was not able to demonstrate the transfer of 





CMA The user’s ability to monitor vessel, person, and 
cargo data was severely degraded by gaps in track 
data coverage.  When a node’s CMA server was 
down, or data was not transmitted, the data not 
received was not recoverable.  The Naval Research 
Laboratory limited the National Technical Means 
data source input to CMA to 14 hours per day and 
filtered the data that was provided.  This resulted in a 
gap of data which had a negative impact across all 





TES - Although wireless, the TED devices were 
required to be in the vicinity of the TEMP in order to 
download data captured during the boarding. The 
radio frequency (RF) signals were not storing enough 
to transmit data when team members were below 
decks.  (VBSS School) 
Operations Performance: 
MIO: Execution 
E-MIO There were no positions provided with the latent print 
messages and for the cave collection, there was no 
Seek ID Global Positioning System (GPS) reception 
and therefore no position was included in the 
biometric messages. 




































































































Operations Performance: Knowledge Processes: VoI Development 2.5 1.0  2.0 3.0   2.1 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 
Operations Performance: Knowledge Processes: VoI Tracking 2.3       3.0      2.4 
Operations Performance: MIO: Execution  1.8            1.8 
Organization/Guidance: Agreements: Information Sharing       2.0   2.0    2.0 
Organization/Guidance: Guidance: Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 2.0             2.0 
Organization/Guidance: Guidance: Tactics, Techniques, Procedures 
(TTP/SOP) 
2.0             2.0 
Organization/Guidance: MDA Compatibility: Organization Alignment             2.0 2.0 
Organization/Guidance: MHQ/MOC Compatibility: Organization 
Alignment 
            2.0 2.0 
Organization/Guidance: MHQ/MOC Compatibility: Process Alignment             3.0 3.0 
System Performance: System Management and Security 1.7            2.5 2.0 
System Performance: Automation: Alerts 2.3  2.3     2.5   3.0 3.0 1.3 2.3 
System Performance: Automation: Information Processing        3.0      3.0 
System Performance: Operations Support: Standards and Guidelines             2.0 2.0 
System Performance: Operations Support: System Utility 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0  3.0    3.0 2.3 2.6 
System Performance: Technical Performance: Information Processing             2.0 2.0 
System Performance: Technical Performance: Information Retrieval 2.3   2.0 3.0 2.5  2.2  3.0 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.3 
System Performance: Technical Performance: Info. Sharing 2.2 3.0  2.0 1.5   3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0  1.8 2.2 
System Performance: Technical Performance: Interoperability 2.0  2.0  2.0         2.0 
System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance: Human-System 
Interaction 
2.5 2.0 2.3  3.0   2.0 2.0  3.0  2.0 2.4 
System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance: System Training 2.5 2.4      2.0 2.0    2.0 2.3 
System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance: System Usage 3.0           3.0 2.5 2.8 
System Performance: Warfighter Acceptance: System Utility 2.8    2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0  3.0 3.0  2.6 
System Supportability and Readiness: System Supportability and 
Readiness 
            2.0 2.0 
Average 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.4 
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Appendix G:  Mapping of SP-1 Technologies to MDA Capabilities Thresholds 
 










LiNX MAGNET Data Sharing 
COI 




Monitor MT1 X     X X X X  Y 
 MT2 X     X  X X  Y 
 MT3        X   Y 
 MT4 X     X  X X  Y 
 MT5   X        Y 
Collect CT1 X  X   X X X X  Y 
 CT2         X  Y 
 CT3          Y  
 CT4  X         Y 
 CT5     X X     Y 
Fuse FT1 X     X   X  Y 
 FT2        X   Y 
Analyze AT1      X  X   Y 
 AT2          Y  
 AT3 X      X    Y 
 AT4      X     Y 
 AT5          Y  
 AT6   X        Y 
Disseminate DT1    X       Y 
 DT2          Y  
 DT3 X  X      X  Y 
 DT4       X    Y 
 DT5 X        X  Y 
 DT6        X   Y 
 DT7        X   Y 
 DT8 X     X  X   Y 
 DT9 X          Y 
Note: This Table was developed from a presentation by PEO C4I concerning MDA test and evaluation, 21 Feb 2008 (PEO_C4I_MDA_TE Update Issues_FINAL rev2_20FEB2008.ppt) 
Note: MDA Capability Thresholds are drawn from the OPNAV Scoping Document 
Note: Key to capabilities. 
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Appendix H: Organization/Guidance Results 
Item 
ID 






Information from a stand-alone MAGNET system was not available due to 
sharing agreements concerning U.S. persons information.   
constraints imposed by 
policies and agreements




MIDAS:  Respondents acknowledged that there is currently a need to 
collaborate with other agencies, coalition members and non-traditional 
partners, and most felt that MIDAS would help to facilitate that collaboration; 
however, 2 mentioned that sharing sensitive or classified information might be 
a problem.   
constraints imposed by 
policies and agreements
2 MIDAS TW08 
299 Guidance: 
CONOPS 
CMA - The envisioned CONOPS for future MDA will require training and 
familiarization with the new procedures as evidenced by the following:  (1) 
"Have yet to truly collaborate with others, with the exception of perhaps shared 
watch areas;" and (2) "During the exercise there was a lot of confusion about 
being able to track vessels that come near a specific vessel at any time during 
its track - I still don’t think this function is truly possible." 
training for CONOPS 2 CMA VBSS 
302 Guidance: 
TTP/SOP 
CMA - The envisioned TTP/SOP for future MDA will require training and 
familiarization with the new procedures as evidenced by the following:  (1) 
"Have yet to truly collaborate with others, with the exception of perhaps shared 
watch areas;" and (2) "During the exercise there was a lot of confusion about 
being able to track vessels that come near a specific vessel at any time during 
its track - I still don’t think this function is truly possible." 




ONI expresses concern about lack of lack of re-engineering of processes and 
training.  
coordination of MDA 
and ONI processes 






ONI is conducting process analyses concerning intel analysis. It is not clear 
that this effort is synchronized with the MDA technology effort. 
coordination of MDA 
with ONI processes 








The NPS assessment team is concerned that MDA TTPs need to be sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate differences between COCOMS. 
customization to local 
needs 






Second Fleet, NAVNETWARCOM, and others concur that the MDA 
workflow aligns with the MHQ w MOC process architecture as of early 2008. 
(See Process Alignment Workshop). 
alignment of MDA 
and MHQ w MOC 
processes 
3 All MDA 
Tech 
TW08 
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MDA Capability Indicators (or Assessment Metrics)
Area Effective Utility Area Effective
System Accessible Improved Warfighter
Performance Capable Needed Performance Capable
Reliable Applicable Reliable
Usable Wanted































1. Workflow Analysis and Process Engineering Workshop (PEW): 

 
Overview of MDA  activities, site visits ton NAVCENT, ONI, 2F, 3F, 5F, and 6F.

 
Document the way MDA is currently done and to identify where new tech’s
are expected to have the greatest impact. 

 
Validated in PEW, NPS, Jan 2008, and was mapped to the Maritime Headqrtrs  
with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ w/MOC) core processes.
2. Technical Risk Reduction Limited Objective Experiment, SPAWAR, SD, June 2008 

 
First simultaneous testing of multiple MDA technologies using Fleet 
participants. 
3. Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) School, San Diego
4. Trident Warrior 08 – held aboard multiple Navy ships
5. Empire Challenge 08 – China Lake Naval Station and in San Francisco Harbor, 2008.
6. FAIRGAME – Simultaneous, multiple sites: Naval Maritime Intelligence  
Center (NMIC), NAVCENT, PACFLT, Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, Pacific 



































































































































































































Area Number Data Items Average Score
Operations Performance 70 2.4
Organization/Guidance 8 2.1
System Performance 219 2.4
System Supportability and Readiness 7 2.0
Warfighter Performance 0 -
Total / Average 304 2.4
Score
Assessment Area 1: Deficiency 2: Concern 3: Strength Total
Operations Performance 5 33 32 70
Organization/Guidance 7 1 8
System Performance 10 119 90 219
System Supportability and   
Readiness - 7 - 7




Technology Frequency Average Score
All Spiral-1 47 2.1
CMA 136 2.4
E-MIO Wireless 23 2.1
FASTC2AP 13 2.4
Global Trader 5 2.2










































Score 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.4
Monitor X X X X X X
Collect X X X X X X X X
Fuse X X X X
Analyze X X X X X
Disseminate























































Monitor MT1 X X X X X Y
MT2 X X X X Y
MT3 X Y
MT4 X X X X Y
MT5 X Y




CT5 X X Y
Fuse FT1 X X X Y
FT2 X Y
Analyze AT1 X X Y
AT2 Y








DT3 X X X Y
DT4 X Y
DT5 X X Y
DT6 X Y
DT7 X Y















P; E; C P; E; C F; P; E; C F; P; E; C
E; M; C
E; M; C
E; M; C
E; M; C
E; M; C
E E
E E
E E
E; M
E; ME; M
E; M; C
F; E; B
F; E; B
F; E; BF; E; B
F; E F; E
KEY
B Briefs
C Chat
E Email
F
 
Face to Face
M MsgTraffic
P Phone
t To Be Determined
MOC
External Entity
MDA Workflow v12
NCIS: Intel:
Generate tip intel
Wants: FastC2AP: CENTRIX
30 ONI: Intel:
Generate tip intel
Wants: FastC2AP: CENTRIX
40MARLO: Intel:
Generate tip intel
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
10 Intl Maritime Bureau: Intel:
Generate tip intel
Wants: FastC2AP: CENTRIX
50
COPS Director or BWC: Process VOI:
Process VOI (20% of VOIs)
Wants: CENTRIX
80
FOPS: Process VOI: 
Process VOI (80% of VOIs), Issue RFI
Wants: CENTRIX
90
CIFC: Execute VBSS mission:
Execute VBSS mission
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
240
COPS: Monitor VBSS:
Monitor VBSS Execution
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
250
ONI: Analyze boarding data:
Analyze imagery, vessel parameters
Wants:
210
CIFC: Intel:
Generate tip intel
Wants: FastC2AP: CENTRIX
20
ONA: VOI:
Specify VOI & credibility of intel
(Currently use SeaLink, Intellipedia, Centrix, GoogleEarth, CMA)
Wants: CMA; MAGNET; FastC2AP; GoogleEarth; SMS_JPSC2; CENTRIX
60
MOC Director: Receive VOI:
Receive & route VOI
Wants: CENTRIX
70
ONA: Process RFI:
Process RFI
(Currently use SeaLink, Intellipedia, Centrix, GoogleEarth, CMA)
Wants: CMA; MAGNET; FastC2AP; GoogleEarth; CENTRIX
130
ONI: Process RFI:
Process RFI
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
140
5th Fleet: Execute VBSS mission:
Execute VBSS mission (see attached workflow)
(Currently use SeaLink for historical positioning data)
Wants: CENTRIX
170
MOC: Forward biometrics::
Relay biometrics data
Wants:
190
5th Fleet: Take boarding data:
Take boarding data
Wants:
220
MOC: Complete mission:
Mission completed 
(success or failure)
Wants:
270
ONA: Analyze findings:
Analyze findings from ONI. Advise COPS
(Currently use SeaLink, Intellipedia, Centrix, GoogleEarth, CMA)
Wants: CMA; MAGNET; FastC2AP; GoogleEarth; CENTRIX
230
BWC: Assess tactical assets
Assess tactical asset availability
(Currently use SeaLink for historical positioning data)
Wants: FastC2AP; SMS_JPSC2; CENTRIX
100
MOC Director: Define COA:
Define COA, CAT1‐4
Wants: CENTRIX
110
BWC: Comm orders:
Communicate 
mission orders
Wants: CENTRIX
160
NCIS, CIFC, MARLO, NGA: Process RFI:
Process RFI (May use SeaLink)
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
150
5th Fleet: Take biometrics:
Take biometric data
Wants: E‐MIO
180
MOC: Change mission:
Recommend revision of 
CAT level per findings
Wants:
260
ONA: Monitor VOI:
Monitor VOI (watch list) for 6 months
(Currently use SeaLink, Intellipedia, Centrix, GoogleEarth, CMA)
Wants: CMA; MAGNET; FastC2AP; GoogleEarth; CENTRIX
280
P; E; C; B
MOC: MOC‐MOC handoff:
Hand off mission to
another MOC 
(see attached workflow)
Wants: TBD
115
IWO: Process or Issue RFI:
Issue RFI
Wants: FastC2AP; CENTRIX
120E; 
 
M;
P;
t
BFC (WV):Analyze biometrics:
Analyze fingerprints. (Hits go to ONI & ONA)
Wants:
200
16
